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D E C I S I O N T H E O RY Johanna Thoma
Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the
Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors
will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of
the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy?
Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home
town?
1 decision problems and the uses of decision theory
Giving a decision problem like this some formal structure may be helpful
for a number of interrelated purposes. As an agent, it might help me come
to a better decision. But giving formal structure to a decision problem may
also help a third party: prior to an action, it may help them predict my
behaviour. And after the action, it may help them both understand my
action, and judge whether I was rational. Moreover, giving formal structure
to a decision problem is a pre-requisite for applying formal decision
theories. And formal decision theories are used for all the aforementioned
purposes.
In the case of the decision whether to live on a boat, we could perhaps
represent the decision problem as shown in Table 1. In this matrix, the
rows represent the actions I might take. In our case, these are to either
live on a boat, or not to live on a boat. The columns represent the relevant
states of the world. These are conditions that are out of my control, but
matter for what I should do. Suppose these involve my boat either being
seaworthy, or not being seaworthy. I am uncertain which of these states
of affairs will come about. Finally, the entries in the matrix describe the
possible outcomes I care about that would result from my action combined
with a state of the world.
Boat seaworthy Boat not seaworthy
Live on a boat Life on a boat,
no storm damage
Life on a boat,
storm damage
Stay in home town Life as usual Life as usual
Table 1: Should I live on a boat?
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Since Savage’s (1954) decision theory, it has become standard to charac-
terise decision problems with state-outcome matrices like the one I just
introduced. More generally, let A1 . . . An be a set of n actions that are open
to the agent, and let S1 . . . Sm be m mutually exclusive and exhaustive
states of the world. These actions and states of the world combine to
yield a set of n ·m outcomes O11 . . . Onm. Table 2 shows this more general
state-outcome matrix.
S1 . . . Sm
A1 O11 . . . O1m
...
...
. . .
...
An On1 . . . Onm
Table 2: State-outcome matrix
Given such a representation of a decision problem, formal decision
theories assume that agents have various attitudes to the elements of the
state-outcome matrix. Agents are assumed to have preferences over the
outcomes their actions might lead to. Depending on our interpretation
of decision theory, we may also assume that agents can assign a utility
value to the outcomes, and a probability value to the states of the world.
Decision theories then require the preferences the agent has over actions,
which are assumed to guide her choice behaviour, to relate to those other
attitudes in a particular way.
1.1 Expected Utility Maximisation
Traditionally, the requirement that decision theories place on agents under
conditions of uncertainty has been that agents should maximise their
expected utility, or act as if they did. Decision theories which incorporate
this requirement are known under the heading of ‘expected utility theory’.
In the special case where an agent is certain about the consequences
of each of her actions, this requirement reduces to the requirement to
maximise utility. Since we are always to some extent uncertain about the
consequences of our actions, I will focus on the uncertain case here.1
However, much of the following discussion will also apply to decision-
1 I understand decision-making under ‘uncertainty’ here to refer to any case where an agent
is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A
distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where
‘risk’ refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, ‘uncertainty’ refers to the
case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in
a state of ‘ignorance’ if she cannot make such probability assignments, and ‘ambiguity’
occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.
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making under certainty. Moreover, most of this entry will focus on expected
utility theory. Some alternative decision theories are discussed in Section 6.
As we will see, the requirement to maximise expected utility takes
different forms under different interpretations of expected utility theory.
For now, let us assume that agents can assign utility values u(O) to
outcomes, and probability values p(S) to states of the world. The expected
utility is then calculated by weighting the utility of each possible outcome
of the action by the probability that it occurs, and summing them together.
Expected utility theory instructs us to prefer acts with higher expected
utility to acts with lower expected utility, and to choose one of the acts
with the highest expected utility.
In our example, suppose that I think that the chances that my boat
is seaworthy are 50%, and that the relevant utilities are the ones given
in Table 3. In that case, the expected utility of living on a boat will be
0.5 · 200+ 0.5 · 20 = 110, while the expected utility of staying in my home
town is 100. I conclude I should live on a boat.
Boat seaworthy Boat not seaworthy EU
Live on a boat 200 20 110
Stay in home town 100 100 100
Table 3: Decision problem with utilities
Formally, the expected utility EU(A) of an action can be expressed as
follows:
EU(Ai) =
m
∑
j=1
p(Sj) · u(Oij).
Expected utility theory requires agents to prefer acts for which this
weighted sum is higher to acts for which this weighted sum is lower,
and to choose an action for which this weighted sum is maximised.
1.2 The Uses of Decision Theory
Now we can see how expected utility theory could be put to each of the
different uses mentioned above. The requirement to maximise expected
utility (or to act as if one did), however it is understood, is considered as
a requirement of practical rationality by proponents of expected utility
theory. In particular, the requirements of expected utility theory are often
interpreted to capture what it means to be instrumentally rational, that
is, what it means to take the appropriate means to one’s ends, whatever
While these differences will play a role later in this entry, it is not helpful to make these
distinctions at this point.
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those ends may be. We will see how this may be cashed out in more detail
in Section 3, when we discuss different interpretations of expected utility
theory. For now, note that if we take the utility function to express the
agent’s ends, then the requirement to maximise the expectation of utility
sounds like a natural requirement of instrumental rationality.
Sometimes, the requirements of expected utility theory are also under-
stood as expressing what it means to have coherent ends in the first place.
Constructivists about utility (see Section 3.1) often understand expected
utility theory as expressing requirements on the coherence of preferences.
But on that understanding, too, expected utility theory does not make any
prescriptions on the specific content of an agent’s ends. It merely rules out
certain combinations of preferences. And so for those who think that some
ends are irrational in themselves, expected utility theory will at best be an
incomplete theory of practical rationality.
If we understand the requirements of expected utility theory as require-
ments of practical rationality, it seems like expected utility theory could
help me as an agent make better decisions. After I have formally repre-
sented my decision problem, expected utility theory could be understood
as telling me to maximise my expected utility (or to act as if I did). In the
above example, we employed expected utility theory in this way. Expected
utility theory helped me decide that I should live on a boat. In this guise,
expected utility theory is an action-guiding theory.
From a third party perspective, expected utility theory could also be
used to judge whether an agent’s action was rational. Having represented
the agent’s decision problem formally, we judge an action to be rational if
it was an act with maximum expected utility. This understands expected
utility theory as a normative theory: a theory about what makes it the case
that somebody acted rationally.
It is important to note the difference between the action-guiding and
the normative uses of expected utility theory.2 An action can be rational
according to normative expected utility theory even if the agent did not
use expected utility theory as an action-guiding theory. One could even
hold that expected utility theory is a good normative theory while being
a bad action-guiding theory. This would be the case if most agents are
bad at determining their expected utility, and do better by using simpler
heuristics.3
2 Herbert Simon famously drew attention to this difference when he distinguished between
procedural and substantive rationality, drawing on a similar distinction made by Max Weber
(1922/2005). See Simon (1976).
3 Starting with Tversky and Kahneman (1974), there has been a wealth of empirical literature
studying what kind of heuristics decision-makers use when making decisions under
uncertainty, and how well they perform. See, for instance, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson
(1993) and Gigerenzer, Todd, and Group (2000).
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Expected utility theory is also often put to an explanatory or predictive
use, especially within economics or psychology. If we assume that agents
follow the requirements of expected utility theory, and we know enough
of their preferences or utility and probability assignments, we can use
the theory to predict their behaviour. In this context, philosophers have
been interested more in whether decision theory can help us understand an
agent’s actions. Interpreting an agent as maximising her expected utility
in a formal decision problem may reveal her motives in action, and thus
explain her action.
In fact, there is a tradition in the philosophy of action that claims
that explaining another’s behaviour always involves rationalising her
behaviour to some extent. Davidson (1973) introduced the label ‘radical
interpretation’ for the attempt to infer an agent’s attitudes, such as her
beliefs and desires, from her actions. He believed that this was only
possible if we assume certain rationality constraints on how these attitudes
relate. Ramsey (1926/2010) had already used expected utility theory to
infer an agent’s probabilities, and thus, he argued, her beliefs from her
behaviour. Lewis (1974) showed that expected utility theory captures
Davidson’s constraints on the relationship between beliefs and desires,
and thus can be used to elicit beliefs and desires. Davidson himself later
argued, in Davidson (1985), that expected utility theory can be extended
to further elicit an agent’s meanings, that is, her interpretation of sentences.
This is sometimes known as the interpretive use of decision theory.
And so in the philosophical literature, expected utility theory has been
used as an action-guiding theory, a normative theory, and an interpretive
theory.4 Other decision theories have been put to the same uses. As we
will see in Section 6, there are alternatives to expected utility theory that
offer rival prescriptions of practical rationality. However, most alternatives
to expected utility theory have been introduced as primarily descriptive
theories, that are used to predict and explain behaviour that need not be
rational.
Now that we have seen what kinds of uses expected utility theory can
be put to, the next section will look at some influential applications of
expected utility theory.
1.3 Some Applications
Expected utility theory has proven to be an enormously fruitful theory,
that has been applied in various different fields and disciplines. Originally,
it found application mostly in the theory of consumer choice. This field
4 Bermudez (2009) draws a similar tri-partite distinction between the normative, action-
guiding and explanatory/predictive dimensions of decision theory. Similarly, Buchak
(2016) distinguishes between the normative and interpretive uses of decision theory.
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of economics studies why consumers choose some goods rather than
others, and helps to predict market outcomes. Expected utility theory has
been used to explain the shape of demand curves for goods. The demand
for insurance, in particular, is difficult to understand without a formal
theory of choice under uncertainty. Expected utility theory has also helped
to explain some phenomena that had previously seemed surprising. A
classic example here is adverse selection, which occurs when there is an
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in the market. In these
kinds of situations, sellers of high quality goods may be driven out of
the market. Akerlof (1970) first explained this phenomenon, and a rich
literature has developed since. Einav and Finkelstein (2011) provide a
helpful overview of work on adverse selection in insurance markets.
Decision theory has also found application in many fields outside of
economics. For instance, in politics, it has been used to study voting and
voter turn-out,5 in law it has been used to study judicial decisions,6 and in
sociology it has been used to explain class and gender differences in levels
of education.7
Expected utility theory has also been influential in philosophy. Apart
from it being an important contender as a theory of practical rationality,
expected utility theory plays an important role in ethics, in particular in
consequentialist ethics. Along with Jackson (1991), many consequentialists
believe that agents ought to maximise expected moral goodness. Moreover,
expected utility theory has been applied to the question of what agents
ought to do in the face of moral uncertainty—uncertainty about what one
ought to do, or even about which moral theory is the right one.8
Recently, expected utility theory has found application in epistemology
in the form of epistemic decision theory. Here, agents are modeled as receiv-
ing epistemic utility from being in various epistemic states, such as being
certain of the proposition that my boat is sea-worthy. I will receive a high
epistemic utility from being in that state in the case where my boat in fact
turns out to be seaworthy, and low epistemic utility when my boat turns
out not to be seaworthy. Agents are then modeled as maximising their
expected epistemic utility. Epistemic utility theory has been used to justify
various epistemic norms, such as probabilism (the norm that an agent’s
credences should obey the probability calculus), and conditionalisation
(the norm that agents should update their credences by conditionalizing
their old credence on the new evidence they received). For an overview of
these arguments, see Pettigrew (2011).
5 Downs (1957) counts as the first systematic application of decision theoretic models from
economics to politics. For recent work on voting specifically, see Feddersen (2004).
6 See, for instance, Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013).
7 See, for instance, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997).
8 See, for instance, Lockhart (2000), and Sepielli (2013) for a criticism of Lockhart’s approach.
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1.4 Formulating Decision Problems
How should the decision problems that formal decision theories deal
with be formulated in the first place? In order to apply a formal decision
theory, the choices an agent faces need to already be represented as a
formal decision problem. Table 1 offered one representation of my choice
of whether to live on a boat. But how can we be sure it was the right one?
For his decision theory, Savage (1954) assumed that states are descrip-
tions of the world that include everything that might be relevant to the
agent. Similarly, he thought that descriptions of outcomes are descriptions
of “everything that might happen to the person” (p. 13). Joyce (1999, p. 52)
cashes out a rule for specifying outcomes that also appeals to relevance.
He claims that a description of an outcome should include everything that
might be relevant to the agent, in the following sense: whenever there is
some circumstance such that an agent would strictly prefer an outcome
in the presence of that circumstance to the same outcome in the absence
of that circumstance, the outcome has been underspecified. Importantly,
this implies that an agent’s evaluation of an outcome should be indepen-
dent of the state it occurs in, and the act that brought it about. All of
this means that the sets of states and outcomes will end up being very
fine-grained. Moreover, Savage also thinks of actions as functions from
states to outcomes. This means that in each state, each action leads to a
unique outcome. To ensure this, the set of actions, too, will have to be very
fine-grained.
Note that this means that the decision problem I presented in Table 1
was hopelessly underspecified. When it comes to the decision of whether
to live on a boat for a year or not, I do not only care about whether my boat
will have storm damage or not. I also care, for instance, about whether I
will have enough money for the year. I will evaluate the outcome “Life on
a boat, no storm damage” differently depending on whether I will have
enough money for the year or not. In fact, the exact amount of money I
will have is going to matter for my decision. And so my decision problem
should really distinguish between many different states of affairs involving
me having more or less money, and the many different outcomes that
occur in these states of affairs.
Jeffrey (1965/1983), who offered a famous alternative to Savage’s deci-
sion theory (see Section 2.4), and treated states, acts, and outcomes all as
propositions, went so far as to define outcomes such that they entail an
act and a state. An act and a state are also supposed to entail the outcome,
and so we can simply replace outcomes with the conjunction of an act and
a state in the decision matrix.
These ways of individuating outcomes will obviously lead to very large
decision matrices for any real life decision. There are two reasons why we
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might find this problematic. The first reason has to do with the efficiency
of the decision-making process. If we want our decision theory to be
an action-guiding theory, then decision problems can’t be so complex
that ordinary agents cannot solve them. An action-guiding theory should
be efficient in its application. Efficiency may also be a concern for the
interpretive project. After all, this project wants to enable us to interpret
each other’s actions. And so doing so should not be overly complicated.
Savage called decision problems that specify every eventuality that
might be relevant to an agent’s choice “grand world” decision problems.
Joyce (1999) holds that we should really be trying to solve such a grand-
world problem, but acknowledges that real agents will always fall short
of this. Instead, he claims, they solve “small world” decision problems,
which are coarsenings of grand-world decision problems. If we treat acts,
states and outcomes as propositions, this means that the acts, states and
outcomes of the small world decision problems are disjunctions of the acts,
states, and outcomes of the grand-world decision problem. The decision
problem described in Table 1 is such a small-world decision problem.
Joyce (1999, p. 74) holds that an agent is rational in using such small-
world decision problems to the extent that she is justified in believing
that her solution to the small-world decision problem will be the same as
her solution to the grand-world decision problem would be. This permits
the use of small world decision problems both for the action-guiding and
normative purposes of decision theory whenever the agent is justified in
believing that they are good enough models of the grand-world decision
problem.
Joyce argues that this condition is met in Jeffrey’s decision theory if
an agent correctly evaluates all coarse outcomes and actions, while it is
not generally met in Savage’s decision theory. As will be explained in
Section 2.4, this is due to the feature of partition invariance, which Jeffrey’s
theory has and Savage’s theory does not. Despite these arguments, if
efficiency in decision-making is an important concern, as it is for an action-
guiding theory, one might think that an agent should sometimes base her
decision on a small-world decision problem even if she is fairly certain that
her decision based on the grand-world decision problem will be different.
She might think that her solution to a small-world decision problem will
be close enough to that of the grand-world decision problem, while solving
the small-world decision problem will save her costs of deliberation.
The second argument against having too fine-grained a decision prob-
lem is that this makes expected utility theory not restrictive enough. As
will be explained in more detail in Section 2, the axioms used in the repre-
sentation theorems of expected utility theory concern what combination
of preferences are permissible. If preferences attach to outcomes, and
outcomes can be individuated as finely as we like, then the danger is that
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the norm to abide by the axioms of decision theory does not constrain our
actions much.
For instance, consider the following preference cycle, where a, b and c
are outcomes, and ≺ expresses strict preference:
a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ a.
Preference cycles such as this are ruled out by the transitivity axiom, which
all representation theorems we shall look at in Section 2 share. When
outcomes can be individuated very finely, the following two problems
may arise. Firstly, a number of authors have worried that any potential
circularity in an agent’s preferences can be removed by individuating
outcomes more finely, such that there is no circularity anymore. Secondly,
and relatedly, fine individuation may mean that no outcome can ever be
repeated. In that case, an agent cannot reveal a preference cycle in her
actions, and so we cannot interpret her as being irrational.
To see this, note that if we treat the first and the second occurrence of
outcome a above as two different outcomes, say a1 and a2, the circularity
is removed:
a1 ≺ b ≺ c ≺ a2.
The worry is that this can always be done, for instance by distinguishing
“option a if it is compared to b” from “option a if it is compared to c”. If
this strategy is always available, in what sense is the transitivity axiom a
true restriction of the agent’s preferences and actions? If we can’t show
that decision theory puts real restrictions on an agent’s choices, then this
is a problem especially for the action-guiding and normative projects.
A number of authors9 have held that this problem shows that the axioms
of decision theory on their own cannot serve as a theory of practical
rationality (even a partial one), but have to be supplemented with a further
principle in order to serve their function. Broome (1991, chapter 5) notes
that the problem can be dealt with by introducing rational requirements of
indifference. Rational requirements of indifference hold between outcomes
that are modeled as different, but that it would be irrational for the agent
to have a strict preference between. If there was a rational requirement of
indifference between a1 and a2, for instance, the preference cycle would be
preserved.
However, we may also restrict how finely outcomes can be individuated
to solve the problem, by not allowing a distinction between a1 and a2.
Broome (1991, chapter 5) advocates a rule of individuation by justifiers
that serves the same role as the rational requirements of indifference.
According to this rule, two outcomes can only be modeled as distinct if it
is not irrational to have a strict preference between them.
9 See, especially, Broome (1991), Pettit (1991) and Dreier (1996).
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Pettit (1991) proposes an alternative rule for individuation: two outcomes
should be modeled as distinct just in case they differ in some quality the
agent cares about, where caring about a quality cannot itself be cashed
out in terms of preferences over outcomes. And Dreier (1996) argues that
two outcomes should be distinguished just in case there are circumstances
where an agent has an actual strict preference between them. Note that
this rule for individuation is equivalent to the one proposed by Joyce, but
Pettit’s and Broome’s rules may lead to coarser grained individuations
of decision problems. The coarser grained the individuations, the more
restrictive the axioms of expected utility theory end up being.
2 representation theorems
2.1 The Preference Relation
In decision theory, representation theorems are proofs that an agent’s
preferences are representable by a function that is maximised by the agent.
In the case of expected utility theory, they are proofs that an agent’s
preferences are such that we can represent her as maximising an expected
utility function. As we will see in Section 3, many decision theorists believe
that utility is nothing more than a convenient way to represent preferences.
Representation theorems are crucial for this interpretation of utility. The
significance of the representation theorems will be further discussed in
Section 3.2.
A weak preference relation is a binary relation <, which is usually
interpreted either as an agent’s disposition to choose, or her judgements
of greater choiceworthiness.10 An agent weakly prefers x to y if she finds
x at least as choiceworthy as y, or if she is disposed to choose x when x
and y are available.
We can also define an indifference relation ∼ and a strict preference
relation  in terms of the weak preference relation <:
1. x ∼ y if and only if x < y and y < x,
2. x  y if and only if x < y and not y < x.
Representation theorems take such preference relations as their starting
point. They then proceed by formulating various axioms that pose re-
strictions on the preference relation, some of which are interpreted as
10 Many economists interpret preference as ‘revealed preference’, and claim that an agent
counts as preferring x to y just in case she actually chose x when y was also available. Such
pure behaviourism is usually rejected in the philosophical literature because it takes away
from the explanatory power of preferences, and does not allow for counter-preferential
choice. For a critique of the notion of revealed preference, see Hausman (2000).
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conditions of rationality. Let X be the domain of the preference relation.
What representation theorems prove is the following. If an agent’s prefer-
ences conform to the axioms, there will be a probability function and a
utility function such that:
for all x and y ∈ X, EU(x) ≥ EU(y) if and only if x < y.
All the representation theorems described in the following assume that
the preference relation is a weak ordering of the elements in its domain.
That means that the preference relation is transitive and complete.
Transitivity. For all x, y and z ∈ X, x < y and y < z implies that x < z.
Completeness. For all x and y ∈ X, x < y or y < x.
Section 4 will discuss potential problems with both completeness and
transitivity.
Different representation theorems differ both in terms of the domain
over which the preference relation is defined, and in terms of the other
axioms needed for the representation theorem. They also differ in how
many of the agent’s attitudes other than preferences they take for granted.
Consequently, they result in representation theorems of different strength.
2.2 Von Neumann and Morgenstern
One of the first representation theorems for expected utility is due to von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and takes probabilities for granted.11
In this representation theorem, the objects of preference are lotteries, which
are either probability distributions L = (p1, . . . , pm) over the m outcomes,
or probability distributions over these ‘simple’ lotteries. Probabilities are
thus already part of the agent’s object of preference.
While it helps to think of lotteries in the ordinary sense of monetary
gambles where there is a known probability of winning some prize, von
Neumann and Morgenstern intended for their representation theorem to
have wider application. In our original example, if there is a 50% chance
that my boat is seaworthy, then I face a 50/50 lottery over the outcomes
described in Table 1. Note furthermore that, since we are dealing directly
with probability distributions over outcomes, there is no need to speak of
states of the world.
While von Neumann and Morgenstern’s representation theorem is per-
haps most naturally understood given an objective interpretation of proba-
bility, their representation theorem is in fact compatible with any interpre-
tation of probability. All we need is to already have access to the relevant
11 An earlier representation theorem is due to Ramsey (1926/2010) and derives probabil-
ities as well as utilities. It is often considered as a precursor to Savage’s and Bolker’s
representation theorems, discussed below. See R. Bradley (2004).
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(precise) probabilities when applying the representation theorems. If we
think of probability as the agent’s subjective degrees of belief, we already
need to know what those subjective degrees of belief are. If we think of it
as objective chance, we need to already know what those objective chances
are.
What von Neumann and Morgenstern go on to prove in their represen-
tation theorem is that, provided an agent’s preferences over lotteries abide
by certain axioms, there is a utility function over outcomes such that an
agent prefers one lottery over another just in case its expected utility is
higher. One crucial axiom needed for this representation theorem is the
independence axiom, discussed in Section 5.1.
Note that the result is not that there is one unique utility function which
represents the agent’s preferences. In fact, there is a family of utility func-
tions which describe the agent’s preferences. According to von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s representation theorem, any utility function which
forms part of an expected utility representation of an agent’s preferences
will only be unique up to positive, linear transformations. The different
utility functions that represent an agent’s preferences will thus not all
share the same zero point. What outcome will yield twice as much utility
will then also differ between different utility functions. It is therefore often
claimed that these properties of utility functions represent nothing “real”.
What is invariant between all the different utility functions that represent
the agent’s preferences, however, are the ratios of utility differences, which
can capture the curvature of the utility function. Such ratios are often used
to measure an agent’s level of risk aversion.12
2.3 Savage
While von Neumann and Morgenstern’s representation theorem provides
a representation of an agent’s preferences where probabilities are already
given, Savage (1954) infers both a utility function and probabilities from
an agent’s preferences.13 As we have already seen, the standard tripartite
distinction of actions, outcomes and states of the world goes back to
Savage. Instead of assuming, like von Neumann and Morgenstern did,
that we can assign probabilities to outcomes directly, we introduce a set
12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory’s treatment of risk aversion.
13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory is sometimes referred to as a theory
of decision-making under risk, and Savage’s is referred to as a theory of decision-making
under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective
probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above,
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory can also be applied when probabilities are
subjective.
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of states of the world, which determine what outcome an act will lead to.
The agent does not know which of the states of the world will come about.
Savage takes the agent’s preferences over acts as input, and introduces
a number of axioms on these preferences. He derives both a probability
function over states, which abides by the standard axioms of probability,
and a utility function over outcomes which, like the one von Neumann
and Morgenstern derived, is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Together, they describe an expected utility function such that an act is
preferred to another just in case it has a higher expected utility. Importantly,
the agents in Savage’s decision theory abide by the sure-thing principle,
which serves a role similar to the independence axiom in von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s representation theorem, and will also be discussed in
Section 5.1.
Acts, states and outcomes are all treated as theoretical primitives in
Savage’s framework. But Savage’s representation theorem relies on a
number of controversial assumptions about the act, state and outcome
spaces and their relation. For one, probabilities apply only to states of
the world, and utilities apply only to outcomes. Preferences range over
both acts and outcomes. Savage assumed that an act and a state together
determine an outcome. Most controversially, Savage assumes that there
are what he calls constant acts for each possible outcome, that is, acts
which bring about that outcome in any state of the world. For instance,
there must be an act which causes me great happiness even in the event
that the apocalypse happens tomorrow. What makes things worse, by
completeness, agents are required to have preferences over all these acts.
Luce and Suppes (1965) take issue with Savage’s theory for this reason.
While the results of Savage’s representation theorem are strong, they
rely on these strong assumptions about the structure of the act space. This
is one reason why many decision theorists prefer Jeffrey’s decision theory
and Joyce’s modification thereof.
2.4 Jeffrey, Bolker, and Joyce
Jeffrey’s decision theory, developed in Jeffrey (1965/1983), uses an axioma-
tisation by Bolker (1966). While he does not rely on an act space as rich
as Savage’s, Jeffrey preserves the tripartite distinction of acts, states and
outcomes. However, for him, all of these are propositions, which means
he can employ the tools of propositional logic. Moreover, preferences,
utility and probability all range over all three. Agents end up assigning
70 johanna thoma
probabilities to their own acts,14 and assigning utilities to states of the
world.
Jeffrey’s theory is sometimes known as conditional expected utility
theory, because agents who follow the axioms of his decision theory are
represented as maximisers of a conditional expected utility. In Savage’s
decision theory, the utilities of outcomes are weighted by the unconditional
probability of the states in which they occur. This is also the formulation
we presented in Section 1.1. In the example there, we weighted the possible
outcomes by the probability of the state they occur in. For instance, we
weighted the outcome of enjoying a year on a boat without damages by
the probability of my boat being seaworthy.
Jeffrey noted that the unconditional nature of Savage’s decision theory
may produce the wrong results in cases where states are made more or
less likely by performing an action. In our example, suppose that, for
whatever reason, my choosing to live on a boat for a year makes it more
likely that my boat is seaworthy. The unconditional probability of the boat
being seaworthy is lower than the probability of it being seaworthy given
I decide to live on the boat. And thus using the unconditional probability
may lead to the judgement that I shouldn’t spend the year on the boat,
because the probability of it not being seaworthy is too high—even if the
boat will be very likely to be seaworthy if I choose to do so. To avoid this
problem, Jeffrey argued, it is better to use probabilities that are in some
sense conditional on the action whose expected utility we are evaluating.
We should weight the outcome of spending a year on a boat without
damage by the probability of the boat being seaworthy given that I choose
to live on the boat for a year.15
Let the probability of a state given an act be pA(S). There is much
disagreement on how this probability is to be interpreted. The main
disagreement is whether it should be given a causal or an evidential
interpretation. I postpone this discussion to Section 3.3. But let me note
here that Jeffrey himself falls on the evidential side. Conditional expected
utility theory advises us to maximise the following:
EU(Ai) =
m
∑
j=1
pAi(Sj) · u(Oij).
Jeffrey interprets this conditional expected utility as an act’s ‘news value’,
that is, as measuring how much an agent would appreciate the news that
the act is performed.
14 This is a controversial feature of the theory. See Spohn (1977) for criticism of this assump-
tion.
15 Savage’s own solution to the problem is that, for his formalism to apply, states and acts
need to be specified such that there is no dependence between an action being performed
and the likelihood of a state. Jeffrey’s response is more elegant in that it requires no such
restriction on what kinds of decision problems it can be applied to.
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The conditional nature of Jeffrey’s decision theory is also what leads to
its partition invariance.16 In Jeffrey’s theory, the value of a disjunction is
always a function of the value of its disjuncts. For instance, the value of
a coarse outcome O1−10 which is a disjunction of outcomes O1, . . . , O10 is
a function of the values of the outcomes O1, . . . , O10. But we could also
subdivide the coarse outcome O1−10 differently. O1−10 is also a disjunction
of the coarse outcomes O1−5 and O6−10, which are themselves disjunctions
of O1, . . . , O5 and O6, . . . , O10 respectively. And so we can also calculate
the value of O1−10 from the values of O1−5 and O6−10. Partition invariance
means that we get the same value in either case. The value of O1−10
can be represented as a function of the values of any of its subdivisions.
This means that, as long as utilities are assigned correctly to disjunctions,
Jeffrey’s decision theory gives equivalent recommendations no matter
how finely we individuate outcomes, states and actions. Joyce argues that
for this reason, the use of small-world decision problems is legitimate
in Jeffrey’s decision theory (see Section 1.4), and that that is a major
advantage over Savage’s unconditional, and partition variant decision
theory.
Jeffrey’s and Bolker’s representation theorem is less strong than Savage’s.
It does not pin down a unique probability function. Nor does it result
in a utility function that is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Instead, it only ensures that probability and utility pairs are unique up to
fractional linear transformations.17
Joyce (1999) argues that this shows that we need to augment Jeffrey’s and
Bolker’s representation theorem with assumptions about belief, and not
merely preference. Unlike von Neumann and Morgenstern, however, he
does not propose to simply assume probabilities. Instead, he introduces a
‘more likely than’ relation, on which we can formulate a number of axioms,
just as we did for the preference relation. The resulting representation
theorem results in a unique probability function and a utility function
which is unique up to positive linear transformations.18
We have introduced the most prominent representation theorems for
expected utility theory.19 What do these representation theorems show?
Each of them shows that if an agent’s preferences abide by certain axioms,
and certain structural conditions are met, her preferences can be repre-
sented by a utility (and probability) function (or families thereof) such
that she prefers an act to another just in case its expected utility is higher.
16 See Joyce (1999), pp. 121-122.
17 A fractional linear transformation transforms u to a·u+bc·u+d , with a · d− b · c > 0.
18 Also see R. Bradley (1998), for an alternative way to secure uniqueness.
19 A helpful, more technical and more detailed overview of representation theorems can be
found in Fishburn (1981).
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Agents who abide by the axioms can thus be represented as expected
utility maximisers.
What these kinds of results show depends to some extent on the purpose
we want to put our theory to. But it also depends on how we interpret
the utilities and probabilities expected utility theory deals with. Section 3
gives an overview of these interpretations and then returns to the question
of what the representation theorems can show.
3 interpretations of expected utility theory
3.1 Interpretations of Utility
Some of the earliest discussions of choice under uncertainty took place
in the context of gambling. The idea that gamblers maximise some ex-
pected value first came up in correspondence between Fermat and Pascal
(1654/1929). Pascal, who formulated the expected value function in this
context, thought of the value whose expectation should be maximised as
money. This is natural enough in the context of gambling. Similarly, in this
context it is natural to think of the probabilities involved as objective, and
fixed by the parameters of the game.
However, money was soon replaced by the notion of utility as the value
whose expectation is to be maximised. This happened for two interrelated
reasons. First, the same amount of money may be worth more or less to
us depending on our circumstances. In particular, we seem to get less
satisfaction from some fixed amount of money the more money we already
have. Secondly, the norm to maximise expected monetary value has some
counterintuitive consequences. In particular, we can imagine gambles that
have infinite monetary value, that we would nevertheless only pay a finite
price for. Nicolas Bernoulli first demonstrated this with his famous St.
Petersburg Paradox.20
In response to these problems, Daniel Bernouilli (1738/1954) and Gabriel
Cramer independently proposed a norm to maximise expected utility
rather than expected monetary value. However, this raises the problem of
how to interpret the notion of utility. One strand of interpretations takes
utility to be a real psychological quantity that we could measure. Let us
call such interpretations of utility ‘realist’. Early utilitarians adopted a
realist interpretation of utility. For instance, Bentham (1789/2007) and Mill
(1861/1998) thought of it as pleasure and the absence of pain.
20 Bernoulli proposed a gamble in which a coin is thrown repeatedly. If it lands heads the
first time, the player gets $2. If it lands tails, the prize is doubled, and the coin thrown
again. This procedure is repeated indefinitely. The expected value of the resulting gamble
is thus $2 · 12 + $4 · 14 + $8 · 18 + . . ., which is infinite. However, most people would only
pay a (low) finite amount for it.
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Note, however, that these utilitarians were interested in defining utility
for the purpose of an ethical theory rather than a theory of rationality. One
problem with interpreting utility as pleasure in the context of expected
utility theory is that the theory then seems to imply that true altruism can
never be rational. If rationality requires me to maximise my own expected
pleasure, then I can never rationally act so as to increase somebody else’s
happiness at my own expense.
For this and other reasons modern realists typically think of utility as a
measure of the strength of an agent’s desire or preference, or her level of
satisfaction of these desires or preferences. I may strongly desire somebody
else’s happiness, or be satisfied if they achieve it, even if that does not
directly make me happy.21 Jeffrey (1965/1983), for instance, speaks of
desirabilities instead of utilities, and interprets them as degrees of desire
(p. 63). The corresponding realist interpretation of the probabilities in
expected utility theories is usually that of subjective degrees of belief.
The representation theorems described in Section 2 have, however, made
a different kind of interpretation of utility (and probability) possible, and
popular. These representation theorems show that preferences, if they
conform to certain axioms, can be represented with a probability and
utility function, or families thereof. And so, encouraged by these results,
many decision theorists think of utility and probability functions as mere
theoretical constructs that provide a convenient way to represent binary
preferences. For instance, Savage (1954) presents his theory in this way.
Importantly, on this interpretation, we cannot even speak of probabilities
and utilities in the case where an agent’s preferences do not conform with
the axioms of expected utility theory. Let us call these interpretations of
utility and probability ‘constructivist’.22
3.2 The Significance of the Representation Theorems
Whether we adopt a realist or a constructivist interpretation of utility
matters for how expected utility theory can serve the three purposes of
decision theory described in Section 1.2, and for what the representation
theorems presented in Section 2 really establish. Let us first look at the
interpretive project. As already mentioned, those interested in the interpre-
tive project have mostly been interested in inferring an agent’s beliefs and
21 This is also the interpretation adopted by several later utilitarians, such as Hare (1981) and
Singer (1993).
22 See Dreier (1996) and Velleman (1993/2000) for defenses of constructivism. Buchak (2013)
draws slightly different distinctions. For her, any view on which utility is at least partially
defined with respect to preferences counts as constructivist. Since this is compatible with
holding that utility is a psychologically real quantity, she allows for constructivist realist
positions. The position that utility expresses strength of desire, for her, is such a position. I
will count this position as realist, and not constructivist.
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desires from her choice behaviour. If that is the goal, then the probabilities
and utilities involved in decision theory should at least be closely related
to desires and beliefs. Under the assumption that agents maximise their
utility and probability functions, thus understood, we can hypothesise,
perhaps even derive, probability and utility functions that motivate an
agent’s actions.
How could the representation theorems we described in Section 2 help
with this project? They go some way towards showing that beliefs and
desires can be inferred from an agent’s choice behaviour. But the following
assumptions are also needed for this project to succeed:
1. The agent’s choice behaviour must reflect her preferences, at least
most of the time. This assumption is more likely to be met if we think
of preferences as a dispositions to choose, rather than as judgements
of choiceworthiness.
2. The axioms of the representation theorems must be followed by the
agent, at least most of the time. If we want to use expected utility
theory to deduce an agent’s beliefs and desires, then the agent’s
preferences have to be representable by an expected utility function.
While we can interpret the axioms as rationality constraints, these
cannot be the kinds of constraints that people fail to meet most of
the time. In particular, if we want to employ expected utility theory
for Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’, then the choice behaviour of
agents who fail to abide by the axioms will turn out to be unintelli-
gible.
3. The probabilities and utilities furnished by the representation theo-
rem must correspond to the agent’s actual beliefs and desires.
Assumption 2 is controversial for the reasons described in Section 4
and Section 5. But assumption 3 is also problematic. The representation
theorems only show that an agent who abides by the axioms of the
various representation theorems can be represented as an expected utility
maximiser. But this is compatible with the claim that the agent can be
represented in some other way. It is not clear why the expected utility
representation should be the one which furnishes the agent’s beliefs and
desires.23
To answer this challenge, the best strategy seems to be to provide
further arguments in favour of expected utility maximisation, and in
23 This question was raised, for instance, by Zynda (2000), Hajek (2008) and Meacham and
Weisberg (2011). Zynda (2000) argues that the representation theorems alone cannot show
that agents do or should have probabilistic degrees of belief. Meacham and Weisberg (2011)
provide a number of arguments why the representation theorems alone cannot serve as
the basis of decision theory.
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favour of probabilistic beliefs, apart from the plausibility of the axioms
of the representation theorems. Suppose we think it is plausible that
agents should have probabilistic degrees of belief, and should maximise
the expected degree of satisfaction of their desires. And suppose we also
think that our preferences are closely related to our desires. Then if, given
some plausible axioms, these preferences can be given an expected utility
representation, we seem to have good reason to think that the utilities and
probabilities furnished by the representation theorem correspond to our
degrees of belief and strength of desire.
Setting aside the question of why we might want to have probabilistic
degrees of belief, what could such realist arguments for expected utility
maximisation be? Note that, for the purposes of the interpretive project,
these arguments have to not only be normatively compelling, but also
convince us that ordinary agents would be expected utility maximisers.
One type of argument appeals to the advantages of being an expected
utility maximiser when making decisions in a dynamic context. These
will be covered in Section 7. Pettigrew (2014) makes another argument:
for most realists, utility is supposed to capture everything an agent cares
about. If that is true, then it seems plausible to say that in uncertain
situations, I should be guided by my best estimate of how much utility
I will get. We can appeal to results in de Finetti (1974) to argue that an
agent’s best estimate of a quantity is her subjective expectation. This is so
because any estimate of the quantity that is a weighted sum different from
the expectation will be accuracy dominated by an expectational estimate:
the expectational estimate will be closer to the true value no matter what
happens. Thus, I should maximise my expected utility.
So far, we have assumed a realist interpretation of utility and probability.
Note, however, that expected utility theory could still be explanatorily
useful even if a constructivist interpretation of utility and probability are
adopted. It is often argued that the representation theorems show that
the utility and probability functions allow for a simpler and more unified
representation of an agent’s preferences: all the agent’s preferences can
be described with one utility and probability function. This could be seen
to make them more intelligible. In fact, Velleman (1993/2000) argues that
being an expected utility maximiser makes an agent more intelligible to
herself and others, and that this gives her a reason to be an expected utility
maximiser.
Let us now turn to the action-guiding and normative projects. These
projects will lead to quite different prescriptions depending on whether
utility is interpreted in a realist or in a constructivist sense. Suppose that
we are constructivists about utility. In that case, there is a sense in which
the prescription to maximise expected utility does not make any sense.
If one abides by the axioms of one’s favourite representation theorem,
76 johanna thoma
one’s preferences are representable as expected utility maximising. To
maximise expected utility, there is nothing more one needs to do, apart
from act according to the preferences over acts one already has. But if one’s
preferences do not abide by the axioms, on the other hand, one simply
does not have a utility function whose expectation one could maximise.
Consequently, constructivists often interpret the prescription of expected
utility theory as a prescription to have preferences such that one can be
represented as an expected utility maximiser. That is, one should abide by
the axioms of expected utility theory. For the action-guiding project, this
means that, as an agent, I should have preferences such that they abide by
the axioms of expected utility theory. For the normative project, it means
that we judge an agent to be irrational if she has preferences that violate
the axioms. This is why constructivists often interpret expected utility
theory as a theory about what it means to have coherent preferences or
ends, rather than as a theory of means-ends rationality.
For realists, however, the prescription to maximise expected utility
makes sense even independently of the representation theorems canvassed
in Section 2. Consider first the action-guiding project, which aims to
interpret expected utility theory as a theory that can guide an agent in
deciding what to do. If utility is just my strength of desire, and probability
is my degree of belief, and I have introspective access to these, then I can
determine the expected utility of the various acts open to me. I can do so
without considering the structure of my preferences, and whether they
abide by the axioms of expected utility theory. Expected utility theory is
then action-guiding without appeal to representation theorems. But note
that the advice to maximise expected utility is only useful to agents if
they really have such intuitive access to their own degrees of belief and
strength of desire.24
Similarly, if we are realists and our interests are normative, we can judge
an agent to be irrational by considering her utilities and degrees of belief,
and determining whether she failed to maximise expected utility. This
is because there will be facts about the agent’s utilities and probabilities
even if she fails to maximise expected utility. Realists about utility and
probability can also help themselves to the realist arguments for expected
utility maximisation just mentioned. For them, the normative force of
expected utility theory does not depend solely on the plausibility of the
axioms of expected utility theory. If we adopt a realist interpretation of
utility and probability, it is also easier to argue that expected utility theory
provides us with a theory of instrumental rationality. Maximising expected
utility could be seen as taking the means towards the end of achieving
maximum utility. However, realists will also have to provide an argument
that this is a goal rational agents ought to have.
24 Also see Bermudez (2009) on this claim.
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3.3 Causal and Evidential Interpretations of Expected Utility Theory
We have said that the probabilities involved in expected utility theory are
usually interpreted as subjective degrees of belief, at least by realists. As we
have seen, Jeffrey, Joyce, and others have advocated a conditional expected
utility theory. In conditional expected utility theory, agents determine
an act’s expected utility by weighting utilities by the different states’
probabilities conditional on the act in question being performed. Above,
we called this probability pA(S). How this probability is to be interpreted
is a further important interpretive question. The main disagreement is
about whether it should be given a causal or an evidential interpretation.
Jeffrey himself had worked with an evidential interpretation, while causal
decision theorists, such as Gibbard and Harper (1978/1981), Armendt
(1986), or Joyce (1999)25 have given it a causal interpretation.
The difference between these two interpretations is brought out by the
famous Newcomb Problem, first introduced by Nozick (1969). In this
problem, we imagine a being who is very reliable at predicting your
decisions, and who has already predicted your choice in the following
choice scenario. You are being offered two boxes. One is opaque and either
has no money in it, or $1,000,000. The other box is clear, and you can see
that it contains $1,000. You can choose to either take only the opaque box,
or to take both boxes. Under normal circumstances, it would seem clear
that you should take both boxes. Taking the clear box gives you $1,000
more no matter what.
The complication, however, is that the being’s prediction about your
action determines whether there is money in the opaque box or not. If the
being predicted that you will take two boxes, then there is no money in
the opaque box. If the prediction was that you will take only the opaque
box, there will be money in it. Since the being’s prediction is reliable, those
who take only one box tend to end up with more money than those who
take two boxes.
Note that while this case is unrealistic, there are arguably real-life cases
that resemble the Newcomb Problem in its crucial features. In these cases,
the acts available to an agent are correlated with good or bad outcomes
even though these are not causally promoted by the act. This happens in
medical cases, for instance, if a behavioural symptom is correlated with a
disease due to a common cause. Before the causal link between smoking
and lung cancer was firmly established, interested parties hypothesised
that there may be a common cause which causes both lung cancer, and the
disposition to smoke. If that were right, smoking would not cause lung
25 Joyce also first showed that the two interpretations can be given a unified treatment in a
more general conditional expected utility theory.
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cancer, but merely give you evidence that you are more likely to develop
it.26
Evidential and causal decision theory come apart in their treatment of
these cases. Evidential decision theory traditionally interprets pA(S) as a
standard conditional probability:
pA(S) =
p(A&S)
p(A)
.
According to this interpretation, the probability of the state where there is
$1,000,000 in the opaque box conditional on taking only one box is much
higher than the probability of the state where there is $1,000,000 in the
opaque box conditional on taking two boxes. This is because the act of
taking only one box provides us with evidence that the prediction was
that you would take only one box, in which case there is money in the
opaque box. And so expected utility maximisation would tell you to take
only one box.
Causal decision theorists take issue with this, because at the time of
decision, the agent’s actions have no more influence on whether there
is money in the opaque box or not. Either there is or there isn’t already
money in the box. In either case, it is better for you to take two boxes, as
Table 4 illustrates. This kind of dominance reasoning speaks in favour of
taking both boxes.
Prediction: one box Prediction: two boxes
Take one box $1, 000, 000 $0
Take two boxes $1, 001, 000 $1, 000
Table 4: The Newcomb Problem
Causal decision theory allows for this by giving pA(S) a causal inter-
pretation. It measures the causal contribution of act A to whether state
S obtains. Following a proposal by Stalnaker (1972/1981), Gibbard and
Harper (1978/1981) use the probability of a conditional in their causal
decision theory, instead of a conditional probability. In particular, they use
the probability of the conditional that an outcome would occur if an action
was performed.27
In the Newcomb Problem, neither the act of taking nor the act of not
taking the clear box make any causal contribution to whether there is
money in the opaque box. And so, on the causal interpretation, pA(S)
26 See Price (1991) for more examples.
27 Lewis (1981) shows that if the right partition of acts, states and outcomes is used, Savage’s
decision theory will give the same recommendations as Gibbard and Harper’s, and is thus
a type of causal decision theory.
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just equals the unconditional probability p(S) in both cases. And then
dominance reasoning becomes relevant.
Note, however, that it is controversial whether taking both boxes really
is the rational course of action in the Newcomb Problem. Those who
advocate ‘one-boxing’, such as Horgan (1981/1985) and Horwich (1987),
point out that one-boxers end up faring better than two-boxers. It is also
controversial whether evidential decision theory really does yield the
recommendation to one-box if the problem is represented in the right
way: Eells (1981) argues that evidential decision theory, too, recommends
two-boxing.
Jeffrey (1965/1983) himself supplements evidential decision theory with
a ratifiability condition, which allows him to advocate two-boxing. The
condition claims that an agent should maximise expected utility relative to
the probability function she will have once she finally decides to perform
the action. In the Newcomb Problem, only two-boxing is ratifiable. If the
agent decided to one-box, she would then be fairly certain that there is
money in the opaque box, and then she will wish she had also taken the
second box. If she decides to two-box, she will be fairly certain that there
is no money in the opaque box, and she will be glad that she at least got
the $1,000.28
4 incompleteness and imprecision
Several important challenges to expected utility theory have to do with
the fact that expected utility theory asks us to have attitudes that are more
extensive and precise than the preferences ordinary decision makers have.
In fact, in many cases it does not seem irrational to have attitudes that
are in some way imprecise or incomplete. And so the problems discussed
in the following arise both for the interpretive as well as for the action-
guiding and normative uses of decision theory.
The challenge takes different forms for constructivists and realists. For
constructivists, imprecision and incompleteness will manifest as violations
of the axioms of the representation theorems presented in Section 2. As
we have seen, all of these representation theorems assume that the agent’s
preference relation forms a weak ordering of the elements in its domain.
This means that the preference relation must be transitive and complete.
28 The status of the ratifiability condition is still a part of the contemporary debate on
causal decision theory. One open question is what decision should be favoured in cases of
decision instability, where no action is ratifiable, like in Gibbard and Harper’s Death in
Damascus case (see Gibbard and Harper (1978/1981), and Egan (2007) for further, similar
cases). Arntzenius (2008) and Joyce (2012) argue for ways of dealing with this problem.
The ratifiability condition also helps to illuminate certain equilibrium concepts in game
theory (see Joyce and Gibbard (1998)).
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Both assumptions are controversial for related reasons. Completeness
is controversial because it asks agents to have a more extensive set of
preferences than they actually have. Transitivity is controversial in cases
where an agent’s desires are coarse-grained, as will be explained below.
For realists, a related challenge is that both our degrees of belief and our
strength of desire are not precise enough to allow for representation in
terms of a precise probability and utility function.
4.1 Incompleteness
To start with the completeness condition, the worry here is that agents
simply do not have preferences over all the elements of the set the decision
theory asks them to have preferences over. For instance, if I have lived in
Germany all my life, I might simply have no preference between living
in Nebraska and living in in Wyoming. It’s not that I have never heard
of these places. The question would just never occur to me. It might then
neither be the case that I prefer Nebraska to Wyoming nor that I prefer
Wyoming to Nebraska. I am also not indifferent between the two. I might
simply have no preference. But if these outcomes are part of the set of
outcomes the decision theory asks me to have preferences over, then this
means that I am violating the completeness condition.
Similar claims are often made about cases of incommensurable values.
In a famous example due to Sartre (1945/2007), a young man has to choose
between caring for his sick mother and joining the French Resistance. The
two options here are often said to involve incommensurable values: on the
one hand, responsibility to one’s family, and on the other hand, fighting
for a just cause. In these kinds of cases, too, we might want to say that
the young man is neither indifferent, nor does he prefer one option to
the other. And here, this is not because the question of what he prefers
has never occurred to the man. He may in fact think long and hard about
the choice. Rather, he has no preference because the values involved are
incommensurable.
These kinds of examples are more convincing if our notion of preference
is that of a judgement of choiceworthiness. In these examples, agents have
not made, or are unable to make judgements of choiceworthiness about
some of the elements of the relevant set. If one thinks of preference as
disposition to choose instead, one might think that even if an agent never
thought about a particular comparison of outcomes, there can still be a
fact of the matter what she would be disposed to choose if she faced the
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choice. Moreover, if this is our notion of preference, we simply draw no
distinction between indifference and incommensurability.29
However, this alternative notion of preference may get into trouble
when some of the acts in the relevant set are ones that the agent could
not possibly choose between. The completeness condition in standard
expected utility theory may require the agent to have what Broome (1991)
calls ‘impractical preferences’. For instance, it might require an agent to
have a preference between
O1 : an orange,
O2 : an apple when the alternative is a banana.
Choosing between these alternatives is impossible in the sense that O2 will
not come about unless the alternative is a banana, not an orange. And so
it seems like we cannot determine the agent’s choice disposition between
them.
Incompleteness in preference is often dealt with by replacing the com-
pleteness axiom in the various representation theorems with a condition
of coherent extendibility.30 That is, we only require that an agent’s prefer-
ences are such that we could extend her set of preferences in a way that
is consistent with the other axioms of the representation theorem. The
problem with this strategy is that any representation in terms of prob-
ability or utility that the representation theorem furnishes us with will
only be a representation relative to an extension. There will usually be sev-
eral extensions that are consistent with an agent’s incomplete preferences
and the axioms of the theorem. And thus, there will be several possible
representations of the agent’s preferences. The representation theorem
will no longer furnish us with a unique probability function, and a utility
function that is unique up to positive linear transformations. For this
reason, incompleteness of preference is often associated with imprecise
probabilities.
4.2 Imprecise Probabilities
There is an active field of research investigating imprecise probabilities.31
These imprecise probabilities are usually represented by families of proba-
bility functions. And families of probability functions is exactly what the
representation theorems furnish us with if the completeness condition is
29 In fact, Joyce (1999) considers this an important argument against more behaviourist
interpretations of preference.
30 This is the strategy taken by Kaplan (1983), Jeffrey (1965/1983), and Joyce (1999).
31 See S. Bradley (2015) and Mahtani (this volume) for helpful overviews of the literature. For
an introduction to the theory of imprecise probabilities, see Augustin, Coolen, de Cooman,
and Troffaes (2014).
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replaced by a coherent extendibility condition. While this gives even a
constructivist reason to engage with imprecise probabilities, there are also
various realist arguments for doing so. Many formal epistemologists agree
that sharp degrees of belief that can be expressed with a sharp probability
function are both psychologically unrealistic, and cannot be justified in
situations where there is insufficient evidence.32 If we believe that the
probabilities in decision theory should accurately describe our belief states,
the probabilities in decision theory should then be imprecise.
Another motivation for engaging with imprecise probabilities is that
this allows us to treat states or outcomes to which the agent can assign
precise probabilities differently from states or outcomes to which the agent
cannot assign precise probabilities. This may allow us to make sense of the
phenomenon of ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion occurs in situations
where the probabilities of some states are known, but the agent has no
basis for assigning probabilities to some other states. In such situations,
many agents are biased in favour of lotteries where the probabilities are
known. For instance, take the following example from Camerer and Weber
(1992).33
Suppose you must choose between bets on two coins. After
flipping the first coin thousands of times you conclude it is
fair. You throw the second coin twice; the result is one head
and one tail. Many people believe both coins are probably fair
(p(head) = p(tail) = .5) but prefer to bet on the first coin,
because they are more confident or certain that the first coin is
fair. (p. 326)
Standard expected utility theory cannot make sense of this, since it does
not allow us to distinguish between different degrees of uncertainty. In
standard expected utility theory, every state is assigned a precise probabil-
ity. As a result, ambiguity aversion can lead an agent to violate the axioms
of the different representation theorems. In particular, ambiguity aversion
can result in violations of separability (see Section 5) as in the famous
Ellsberg Paradox.34 Nevertheless, ambiguity aversion is common and does
32 For examples of these claims, see, for instance, Levi (1980) and Kaplan (1996). When an
agent cannot assign a sharp probability to states, we sometimes speak of decision-making
under indeterminacy or ignorance, as opposed to merely uncertainty.
33 Camerer and Weber (1992) also provide an overview of the empirical evidence of this
phenomenon.
34 See Ellsberg (1961).The Ellsberg Paradox runs as follows: you are given an urn that you
know contains 90 balls. 30 of them are red. The remaining 60 are either black or yellow,
but you don’t know what the distribution is. Now first, you are offered the choice between
receiving $100 if a red ball is drawn, and receiving $100 if a black ball is drawn. Most
people choose the former. Then, you are offered the choice between receiving $100 if a
red or yellow ball is drawn, and receiving $100 if a black or yellow ball is drawn. Here,
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not seem irrational. Imprecise probabilities may help us to better model
ambiguity, and thus hold the promise to help us rationalise ambiguity
averse preferences.
There are epistemological objections to using sets of probabilities to
represent beliefs.35 But another common objection to using imprecise prob-
abilities is that they lead to bad decision-making.36 How could decision-
making with imprecise probabilities proceed? We can use each probability
function in the family in order to calculate an expected utility for each act
open to the agent. But then each act will be associated with a family of
expected utilities, one for each member of the family of probability func-
tions. And so the agent cannot simply maximise expected utility anymore.
The question then becomes how we should make decisions with these sets
of probabilities and expected utilities.
One type of simple proposal that appears in the literature is the follow-
ing principle, sometimes called Liberal: an act which maximises expected
utility for every probability function in the family is obligatory. And any
act which maximises expected utility for some probability function in the
family is permitted.37 For an overview of other choice rules, see Troffaes
(2007).
Elga (2010) raises an important challenge for all such choice rules. If
they are permissive, as Liberal is, then they will allow us to make choices
in a series of bets that leave us definitely worse off. But if they are not
permissive, and always recommend a single action, they undercut one
main motivation for using imprecise probabilities in the first place. In that
case, they will pin down precise betting odds for an agent. But, Elga argues,
if we think that the evidence does not license us to use a precise probability,
it would be strange if it determined precise betting odds. Moreover, these
betting odds, if they abide by the axioms of expected utility theory, could
be used to infer a precise probability using the representation theorems
discussed above.38
Elga’s argument bears resemblance to other dynamic arguments against
violations of standard expected utility theory, which will be discussed in
most people choose the latter. These preferences display ambiguity aversion. They are not
consistent with a stable assignment of precise subjective probabilities to the drawing of a
yellow or black ball, combined with the assumption of expected utility maximisation.
35 See, for instance, the problem of dilation. Dilation occurs when an agent’s beliefs become
less precise when she updates on a piece of evidence. The phenomenon was first introduced
by Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993) and is argued to be problematic for imprecise
probability theory in White (2010). See Joyce (2011), S. Bradley and Steele (2014b) and
Pedersen and Wheeler (2014) for critical discussion.
36 See, for instance, Williamson (2010).
37 See White (2010), Williams (2014), Moss (2015).
38 However, note that there are choice rules that determine precise betting odds that do not
reduce to expected utility maximisation, such as the one introduced by Sahlin and Weirich
(2014).
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Section 7. It may be challenged on similar grounds. There may be dynamic
choice strategies available to agents that guard them against making
sure losses in dynamic choice problems. In fact, Williams (2014) claims
that agents using his choice rule can make their choices ‘dynamically
permissible’ by only considering some of the probability functions in the
family to be ‘live’ at any one point. S. Bradley and Steele (2014a), too,
argue that agents with imprecise credences can make reasonable choices
in dynamic settings.
4.3 Imprecise Utility and Intransitivity
One might expect there to be a literature on imprecision with regard to
utilities similar to the one on imprecise probabilities. For one, replacing
the completeness condition with a condition of coherent extendibility will
not only lead to a family of probability representations, it will also result
in a corresponding family of utility representations. Moreover, there might
be similar realist arguments that could be made in favour of imprecise
strength of desire or degree of preference. Some of the examples of incom-
pleteness, such as the cases involving incommensurable values, could be
described as examples where it is unclear to what degree an agent desires
the goods in question, or how they compare. Such cases are also often
described as cases of ‘vague preference’. However, imprecise utilities and
vague preferences are so far mostly discussed in the mathematical and
economic literature. Fishburn (1998) suggests a probabilistic approach to
studying vague preferences, while most of the literature uses fuzzy set
theory. Salles (1998) provides an introduction to that approach.
There is a certain kind of lack of precision in our attitudes that does not
result in vague preferences or incompleteness of preference. Instead, this
lack of precision leads to a failure of transitivity, and is thus nevertheless
problematic for expected utility theory. Intransitivity arises for outcomes
that the agent finds indistinguishable with regard to some of the things
she values. The problem is brought out most clearly by the Self-Torturer
Problem, introduced by Quinn (1990). It runs as follows: a person has an
electric device attached to her body that emits electric current which causes
her pain. The device has a large number of settings, such that the person
is unable to tell the difference in pain between any two adjacent settings.
However, she can tell the difference between settings that are sufficiently
far apart. In fact, at the highest settings, the person is in excruciating pain,
while at the lowest setting, she is painless. Each week, the person can turn
the dial of the device up by one setting, in exchange for $10,000.
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Let us call the settings of the dial D0, D1, D2, . . . , D1000. In this problem,
the following set of intransitive preferences seems to be reasonable for a
person who prefers less pain to more pain, and more money to less:
D0 ≺ D1 ≺ D2 ≺ . . . ≺ D1000 ≺ D0.
At the highest settings, the person is in such excruciating pain that she
would prefer being at the lowest setting again to having her fortune. At
the same time, if turning the dial up by one setting results in a level of
pain that is indistinguishable from the previous, it seems that taking the
$10,000 is always worth it, no matter how much pain the agent is already
in.
An agent who has the self-torturer’s preferences is clearly in trouble.
In the original example, she can never turn the dial down again once she
has turned it up. If she always follows her pairwise preferences, she will
end up at the highest setting. This is obviously bad for her, by her own
lights: there are many settings she would prefer to the one she ends up at.
If, on the other hand, we suppose that the agent can go back to the first
setting in the end, the problem is that she could be ‘money-pumped’.39
If the agent has a strict preference for the lowest setting over the highest
setting, she should be willing to pay some positive amount of money on
top of giving up all her gained wealth for going back to the first setting.
She will end up having paid money for ending up where she started.
Advocates of standard expected utility theory may point out that these
observations just show why it is bad to have intransitive preferences.
However, critics, such as Andreou (2006) and Tenenbaum and Raffman
(2012), point out that while these are problematic consequences of having
the self-torturer’s preferences, there seems to be nothing wrong with
the self-torturer’s preferences per se. If the agent’s relevant underlying
desires are those for money and the absence of pain, but the agent cannot
distinguish between the levels of pain of two adjacent settings, then there
is nothing in the agent’s desires concerning the individual outcomes that
could speak against going up by one setting. If we think that preferences
should accurately reflect our underlying desires concerning the outcomes,
the self-torturer’s preferences seem reasonable.
Indeed, proponents of expected utility theory acknowledge that it is
somewhat unsatisfactory to simply declare the self-torturer’s preferences
irrational. They have hence felt pressed to give an explanation of why the
self-torturer’s preferences are unreasonable, despite appearances. Arntze-
nius and McCarthy (1997), and Voorhoeve and Binmore (2006) have made
different arguments to show that rational agents would hold that there
39 Money pumps were first introduced as an argument for transitivity by Davidson, McKinsey,
and Suppes (1955).
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is an expected difference in pain between two adjacent settings at least
somewhere in the chain.
Critics note that it is only in the context of the series of choices she
is being offered that the self-torturer’s preferences become problematic.
And so instead of declaring the self-torturer’s preferences irrational, we
may instead want to say that in some cases, it is rational for the agent
to act against her punctate preferences. Andreou (2006) argues that the
intransitive preferences of the self-torturer ought to be revised to be
transitive for the purpose of choice only. Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012)
note that the underlying problem in the self-torturer’s case is that the
agent’s end of avoiding pain is vague. It is not precise enough to distinguish
between all the different outcomes the decision theory may ask her to
evaluate, and that she in fact may have to choose between. They claim that
vague goals that are realised over time may ground permissions for agents
to act against their punctate preferences. And so this is another type of
imprecision in our attitudes which may call for a revision of standard
expected utility theory.
5 separability
5.1 The Separability Assumption
The imprecision and incompleteness of our attitudes discussed in Section 4
may be a problem for expected utility theory even in the context of certainty.
But another important type of criticism of expected utility theory has to do
with the assumptions it makes about choice under uncertainty specifically.
All the representation theorems canvassed in Section 2 make use of a
similar kind of axiom about choice under uncertainty. These axioms are
versions of what Broome (1991) calls separability. The idea here is that what
an agent expects to happen in one state of the world should not affect
how much she values what happens in another, incompatible state of the
world. There is a kind of independence in value of outcomes that occur
in incompatible states of the world. Separability is largely responsible
for the possibility of an expected utility representation. Separability is
a controversial assumption, for the reasons explained in Section 5.2 and
Section 5.3. Here, I present the versions of the separability assumption
used in the representation theorems introduced in Section 2.
In von Neumann and Morgenstern’s representation theorem (see Sec-
tion 2.2), separability is expressed by the independence axiom. Let L
be the space of lotteries over all possible outcomes. Then independence
requires the following:
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Independence. For all Lx, Ly, Lz ∈ L and all p ∈ (0, 1), Lx < Ly if and
only if p · Lx + (1− p) · Lz < p · Ly + (1− p) · Lz.
Independence claims that my preference between two lotteries will not
be changed when those lotteries become sub-lotteries in a lottery which
mixes each with some probability of a third lottery. For instance, suppose
I know I get to play a game tonight. I prefer to play a game that gives me
a 10% chance of winning a pitcher of beer to a game that gives me a 20%
chance of winning a pint of beer. The independence axiom says that this
preference will not be affected when the chances of me getting to play at
all today change. The possibility of not playing at all tonight should not
affect how I evaluate my options in the case that I do get to play.
In Savage’s framework (see Section 2.3), separability is expressed by his
famous sure-thing principle. To state it, we need to define a set of events,
which are disjunctions of states. Let Ai(E) be the act Ai when event E
occurs. The sure-thing principle then requires the following.
Sure-thing Principle. For any two actions Ai and Aj, and any mutually
exclusive and exhaustive events E and F, if Ai(E) < Aj(E) and
Ai(F) < Aj(F), then Ai < Aj.
The idea behind the sure-thing principle is that an agent can determine her
overall preferences between acts through event-wise comparisons. She can
partition the set of states into events, and compare the outcomes of each of
her acts for each event separately. If an act is preferred given each of the
events, it will be preferred overall. That is, if a particular act is preferred
no matter which event occurs, then it is also preferred when the agent
does not know which event occurs.
In Jeffrey’s decision theory (see Section 2.4), separability is expressed by
the averaging axiom. Remember that for him, acts, states and outcomes
are all propositions, and all objects of preference. The averaging axiom
claims the following.
Averaging. If A and B are mutually incompatible propositions, and
A < B, then A < (A or B) < B.
The averaging axiom claims that how much an agent values a disjunction
should depend on the value she assigns to the disjuncts in such a way that
the disjunction cannot be more or less desirable than any of the disjuncts.
When the propositions involved are outcomes that occur in different states
of the world, this requirement, too, expresses the idea that there is an
independence in value between what happens in separate states of the
world. Knowing only that I will end up with one of two outcomes cannot
be worse than ending up with any of the individual outcomes.
Assuming separability for preferences in the way that the independence
axiom, the sure-thing principle and the averaging axiom do ensures that
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the utility representation has an important separability feature as well. As
we have seen, in expected utility theory, the overall value of an action can
be represented as a probability-weighted sum of the utilities of the out-
comes occurring in separate states. This means that the value contribution
of an outcome in one state will be independent of the value contribution
of an outcome of another state, holding the probabilities fixed. And so
the separability of the value of outcomes in separate states is captured by
equating the value of an action with its expected utility. If separability is
problematic, it is thus problematic independently of any representation
theorem. In particular, this means that it is also problematic for realists.
5.2 Violations of Separability
To see how separability may fail, consider the following decision problem,
known as the Machina Paradox.40 Suppose you prefer actually going to
Venice to staying at home and watching a movie about Venice. You also
prefer watching a movie about Venice to doing nothing and being bored.
You are now offered the lotteries described in Table 5. Suppose that each
lottery ticket is equally likely to be drawn, so that, if we want to apply
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework, each lottery ticket has a
probability of 1%.
Tickets 1–99 Ticket 100
Lottery A Go to Venice Bored at home
Lottery B Go to Venice Movie about Venice
Table 5: Machina’s Paradox
Many people would prefer lottery A to lottery B in this context. Clearly,
if I am so unlucky as to draw ticket 100, I’d rather not have to watch
a movie reminding me of my misfortune. However, my preferences, as
stated, violate the independence axiom and sure-thing principle. It is also
clear why this violation of separability occurs. What happens in alternative,
incompatible states of the world, that is, what might have been, clearly
matters for how I evaluate the outcome of watching a movie about Venice.
If there was a big probability that I could have gone to Venice, I will
evaluate that outcome differently from when there was no such possibility.
In this case, the reason for an interdependence in value between outcomes
in alternative states of the world is disappointment: the movie about Venice
heightens my disappointment by reminding me of what I could have had.
40 See, for instance, Mas-Colell et al. (1995), chapter 6.
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The natural response to this kind of problem is to say that the outcomes
in the decision problem as I stated it were under-described. Clearly, the
feeling of disappointment is a relevant part of the outcomes of lottery B.
There is nothing irrational about wanting to avoid disappointment, and
many agents do. Thus, according to all the rules for the individuation
of outcomes discussed in Section 1.4, watching a movie about Venice
with disappointment should be a different outcome from watching a
movie about Venice without disappointment. And then, no violation of
separability occurs.
This seems to be a valid response in the case of Machina’s Paradox.
However, there are other violations of separability that arguably cannot
be given the same treatment. One famous case that seems to be more
problematic is the Allais Paradox, introduced in Allais (1953). It runs as
follows. First a subject is offered a choice between $1 million for certain
on the one hand, and an 89% chance of winning $1 million, a 10% chance
of winning $5 million, and a 1% chance of winning nothing on the other.
What she will get is decided by a random draw from 100 lottery tickets.
Many people choose $1 million for certain when offered this choice. Next,
the subject is offered the choice of either a 10% chance of $5 million, and
nothing otherwise on the one hand, or an 11% chance of $1 million, and
nothing otherwise on the other. Again, this is decided by the draw of a
lottery ticket. Here, most people pick the first lottery, that is, the lottery
with the higher potential winnings.
While this combination of preferences seems sensible, it in fact violates
independence and the sure-thing principle, given a natural specification
of the outcomes involved. This becomes evident when we represent the
two choices in decision matrices, as in Table 6 and Table 7.
Tickets 1–89 Tickets 90–99 Ticket 100
Lottery C $1 million $5 million $0
Lottery D $1 million $1 million $1 million
Table 6: Allais Paradox: First Choice
Tickets 1–89 Tickets 90–99 Ticket 100
Lottery G $0 $5 million $0
Lottery H $0 $1 million $1 million
Table 7: Allais Paradox: Second Choice
Choosing lottery D in the first choice, and lottery G in the second choice
violates independence and the sure-thing principle. To start with the sure-
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thing principle, note that in both choices, the two lotteries to be chosen
from are identical with regard to what happens if tickets 1–89 are drawn.
And thus, according to the sure-thing principle, the only thing that matters
for the overall assessment should be what happens if tickets 90–100 are
drawn. But for these tickets, the first choice, between lottery C and lottery
D, and the second choice, between lottery G and lottery H are identical.
And so, the agent should choose lottery D in the first choice if and only
if she chose lottery H in the second choice. Similar reasoning applies for
independence, if we regard each lottery as a compound lottery of the
sub-lotteries involving tickets 1–89 and 90–100 respectively.
Nevertheless, choosing lottery D in the first choice and lottery G in the
second choice is both common41 and does not seem intuitively irrational.
Unless some redescription strategy works to reconcile Allais preferences
with expected utility theory, expected utility theory must declare these
preferences irrational. Redescribing the outcomes to take account of dis-
appointment (or regret) arguably cannot do away with the violation of
separability in the Allais Paradox. Michael Weber (1998) provides an exten-
sive argument to that effect. The Ellsberg Paradox (Section 4.2) is another
case that cannot easily be dealt with by redescription. These examples
suggest that there are more problematic types of interdependence in value
between outcomes in different states of the world that cannot be as easily
reconciled with expected utility theory as the Machina Paradox. They have
consequently been an important motivation for alternatives to expected
utility theory (see Section 6).
There might, however, be good arguments in favour of the verdict
that violations of separability, like the Allais preferences, are genuinely
irrational. Savage himself, as well as Broome (1991) argue that our reasons
for choosing one act or another must depend on states of affairs where
the two acts do not yield the same outcome. This seems to speak in
favour of the sure-thing principle. However, as Broome acknowledges, this
assumes that reasons for action themselves are separable. Somewhat more
promisingly, he suggests that, if the kind of rationality we are interested
in is instrumental rationality, then all our reasons for action must derive
from what it would be like to have performed an action in the various
states that might come about.
Buchak (2013), who, as we will see, defends an alternative to expected
utility theory, argues that instrumental rationality does not require sep-
arability. In any case, note that, even if expected utility theory is right
that separability is a requirement of rationality, examples like the Allais
Paradox still show expected utility theory to be quite revisionary. Expected
utility theory declares preferences that are common and seem intuitively
41 See, for instance Morrison (1967) for experimental evidence that many people choose this
way.
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reasonable as irrational. While this may not be troubling in the case of
the normative and action-guiding projects, this at least seriously calls into
question whether expected utility theory can serve the interpretive project.
5.3 Separability and Risk Aversion
Examples like the Allais Paradox seem to show that agents actually care
about some values that are not separable. The Allais preferences, for
instance, make sense for an agent who cares about certainty. Lottery D
in the first choice seems attractive because it leads to a gain of $1 million
for certain. If the agent does not care merely about the feeling of being
certain, but instead cares about it actually being certain that she gets $1
million, then certainty is a value that is only realised by a combination of
outcomes across different states.
Buchak (2013) calls agents who are sensitive to values that are only
realised by a combination of outcomes across different states (other than
expected utility itself) ‘globally sensitive’. Agents who are globally sen-
sitive are sensitive to features other than the expected utility of an act.
Next to certainty, Lopes (1981, 1996) argues that mean, mode, variance,
skewness and probability of loss are further global features of gambles
agents may care about. She argues that a normatively compelling theory
of decision-making under risk would have subjects weigh off these various
different criteria. Buchak (2013), too, argues that global sensitivity can be
rational, under certain constraints.42
It has been argued that expected utility theory has trouble more gen-
erally in accounting for our ordinary attitudes to risk. In expected utility
theory, risk averse behaviour, such as preferring a sure amount of money to
a risky gamble with a higher expected monetary gain, is always explained
by the concavity of the utility function with regard to the good in question.
When a utility function is concave, the marginal utility derived from a
good is decreasing: any additional unit of the good is worth less the more
of the good the agent already has. When the utility function in money is
concave in this way, the expected utility of a monetary gamble will be less
than the utility of the expected monetary value. And this can mean that
the agent rejects gambles that have positive expected monetary value.
Figure 1 illustrates this for an agent with utility function u(m) =
√
m
and current wealth of $100, who is offered a 50/50 chance of either losing
$100 or gaining $125. For her, the expected utility of accepting this gamble
42 There is some debate whether global sensitivity can also be made compatible with ex-
pected utility theory. Weirich (1986) argues that globally sensitive aversion to risk can be
represented with disutilities that are assigned to outcomes. In the context of Buchak’s
theory, Pettigrew (2014) argues that the global sensitivity allowed for by her theory is
compatible with expected utility theory if outcomes are appropriately redescribed.
92 johanna thoma
is 0.5 · √0 + 0.5 · √225 = 7.5. This is less than the agent’s current utility
level of
√
100 = 10. The agent would reject the gamble even though it
leads to an expected gain of $12.50.43
2251000
15
10
7.5
m
u(m) u(m) =
√
m
Figure 1: A concave utility function
However, there are results suggesting that decreasing marginal utility
alone cannot adequately explain ordinary risk aversion. For monetary
gambles, it can be shown that according to expected utility theory, any
significant risk aversion on a small scale implies implausibly high levels
of risk aversion on a large scale. For instance, Rabin and Thaler (2001)
show that an expected utility maximiser with an increasing, concave utility
function in wealth who turns down a 50/50 bet of losing $10 and winning
$11 will turn down any 50/50 bet involving a loss of $100, no matter how
large the potential gain. Conversely, any normal level of risk aversion for
high stakes gambles implies that the agent is virtually risk neutral for
small stakes gambles.44 These results are troubling because we are all risk
averse for small stakes gambles, and we are all willing to take some risky
gambles with larger stakes. Moreover, this does not seem to be intuitively
irrational.
Another, more direct line of critique of the way expected utility theory
deals with risk aversion is available to realists about utility. If we think of
utility in the realist sense, for instance as measuring the strength of our
desire, it seems like we can be risk averse with regard to goods for which
our utility is not diminishing. But according to expected utility theory, we
43 See Mas-Colell et al. (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory’s treatment
of risk aversion.
44 See Samuelson (1963) and Rabin (2000) for similar results.
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cannot be risk averse with regard to utility itself. For realists, depending
on their interpretation of utility, this may be counterintuitive.45
6 alternatives to expected utility theory
Most alternatives to expected utility theory have been introduced as de-
scriptive theories of choice under uncertainty, with no claim to capturing
rational choice. The most well-known is prospect theory, introduced by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Its most distinctive features are firstly,
that it includes an editing phase, in which agents simplify their decision
problems to make them more manageable, and secondly, that outcomes are
evaluated as losses and gains relative to some reference point. In prospect
theory, losses can be evaluated differently from gains. Since different ways
of presenting a decision problem may elicit different reference points, this
means that the agents described in prospect theory are sensitive to ‘fram-
ing’. While real agents are in fact subject to framing effects,46 sensitivity to
framing is commonly regarded as irrational.
Alternatives to expected utility theory in the economic literature, too,
have given up the idea that agents maximise a utility function that is
independent of some reference point. Generalised expected utility the-
ory, as developed in Machina (1982), for instance, introduces local utility
functions, one for each lottery the agent may face. The lack of a stable
utility function makes it difficult to interpret these theories as theories of
instrumental rationality.
Other non-expected utility theories, in particular rank-dependent utility
theory, as introduced by Quiggin (1982), use a stable utility function. In
contrast to expected utility theory, however, they introduce alternative
weightings of the utilities of outcomes. While in expected utility theory,
an outcome’s utility is weighted only by its probability, in rank-dependent
utility theory, weights depend not only on the probability of an outcome,
but also its rank amongst all the possible outcomes of the action. This al-
lows the theory to model agents caring disproportionately about especially
good and especially bad low probability outcomes.
Buchak (2013) introduces risk-weighted expected utility theory, in which
a ‘risk function’ plays the role of the weighting function. In contrast
to older rank-dependent utility theories, she argues that risk-weighted
expected utility theory provides us with utilities and probabilities which
can be interpreted as representing the agent’s ends and beliefs respectively,
45 See Buchak (2013) for this line of critique, as well as more examples of risk aversion that
expected utility has trouble making sense of.
46 See, for instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
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and a risk function, which represents the agent’s preferences over how to
structure the attainment of her ends.47
There is a research programme in the psychological literature that
studies various heuristics that agents use when making decisions in the
context of uncertainty. While these are usually not intended as norma-
tive theories of rational choice, they have plausibility as action-guiding
theories—theories that cognitively limited agents may use in order to
approximate a perfectly rational choice. Payne et al. (1993), for instance,
introduce an adaptive approach to decision-making, which is driven by
the tradeoff between cognitive effort and accuracy. Gigerenzer et al. (2000)
introduce various “fast-and-frugal” heuristics to decision-making under
uncertainty.
7 dynamic choice
So far, we have looked at individual decisions separately, as one-off choices.
However, each of our choices is part of a long series of choices we make in
our lives. Dynamic choice theory models this explicitly. In dynamic choice
problems, choices, as well as the resolution of uncertainty happen sequen-
tially. Dynamic choice problems are typically represented as decision trees,
like the one in Figure 2. The round nodes in this tree are chance nodes,
where we think of the agent as going ‘left’ or ‘right’ depending on what
state of affairs comes about. The square nodes are decision nodes, where
the agent can decide whether to go ‘left’ or ‘right’.
There are a number of interesting cases where an agent ends up making
a series of seemingly individually rational choices that leave her worse off
than she could be.48 Dynamic choice theory helps us analyse such cases.
Here I want to focus on dynamic choice problems involving agents who
violate standard expected utility theory. These cases provide some of the
most powerful arguments in favour of expected utility theory, and against
the alternatives canvassed in Section 6. We already mentioned Elga’s
dynamic choice argument against imprecise probabilities in Section 4.2.
Here, I turn to arguments involving violations of separability.
7.1 Dynamic Arguments in Favour of Separability
Machina (1989) discusses the following dynamic version of the Allais
Paradox. This dynamic version serves as an argument against Allais pref-
erences, and violations of separability more generally. In this dynamic
47 For an overview of other alternatives to expected utility theory in the economic literature,
the two most comprehensive surveys are Schmidt (2004) and Sugden (2004).
48 One example is the Self-Torturer Problem discussed in Section 4.3. Andreou (2012) is a
helpful overview of more such cases.
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version, agents only get to make a decision after some of the uncertainty
has already been resolved. They make a choice after they have found out
whether one of tickets 1–89 has been drawn, or one of tickets 90–100 has
been drawn, as shown in Figure 2.
$1 million
Ti
ck
et
s
1-
89
$1 million
Lo
tte
ry
D
$0
Ti
ck
et
10
0
$5 million
Tickets
90-99
Lottery
C
Tickets
90-100
(a) First Choice
$0
Ti
ck
et
s
1-
89
$1 million
Lo
tte
ry
H
$0
Ti
ck
et
10
0
$5 million
Tickets
90-99
Lottery
G
Tickets
90-100
(b) Second Choice
Figure 2: Dynamic Allais Problem
The interesting feature of the dynamic case is that at the time where
the agent gets to make a decision, the rest of the tree, sometimes called
the ‘continuation tree’, looks the same for the first and second choice. We
might think that this means that the agent should decide the same in
both cases. But then she will end up choosing in accordance either with
lotteries C and G respectively, or with lotteries D and H respectively, but
not according to the Allais preferences. That in turn means that for at least
one of the choices, an agent with Allais preferences will end up choosing
contrary to what she would have preferred at the beginning of the decision
problem, before any uncertainty has been resolved.
This has been held to be problematic for a variety of reasons. Firstly,
for the agent we are considering, the dynamic structure of the decision
problem clearly makes a difference to what she will choose. It can make a
difference whether the agent faces a one-off choice or a dynamic version
of that choice involving the same possible outcomes. But, it is claimed, for
instrumentally rational agents, who care only about the final outcomes,
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the temporal structure of a decision problem should not matter. Secondly,
suppose the agent anticipates that, after uncertainty has been removed, she
will go against the preferences she has at the outset. Such an agent would
presumably be willing to pay to either not have uncertainty removed,
or to restrict her own future choices. Paying money for this looks like a
pragmatic cost of having these kinds of preferences. Moreover, refusing
free information has been argued to be irrational in its own right.49 Thirdly,
the agent does not seem to have a stable attitude towards the choice to
be made in the dynamic decision problem, even though her underlying
preferences over outcomes do not change. All of these considerations have
been argued to count against the instrumental rationality of an agent with
Allais preferences.
Similar dynamic choice problems can be formulated whenever there is
a violation of separability. In Savage’s framework, whenever the agent’s
attitudes are non-separable for two events, one can construct decision
problems where the two events are de facto ‘separated’ by revealing which
of the events occurs before the agent gets to decide. And then parallel
problems will arise. In fact, if we find the previous argument against Allais
preferences convincing, we can formulate a very general argument in
favour of expected utility theory. Spelling out the argument from conse-
quentialism in Hammond (1988) in more precise terms, McClennen (1990)
shows that, given some technical assumptions, expected utility theory can
be derived from versions of the following principles:
NEC (Normal-form/Extensive-form Coincidence). In any dynamic
decision problem, the agent should choose the same as she would,
were she to simply choose one course of action at the beginning of
the decision problem.
SEP (Dynamic Separability). Within dynamic decision problems, the
agent treats continuation trees as if they were new trees.
DS (Dynamic Consistency). The agent does not make plans she foresee-
ably will not execute.
A similar argument is made by Seidenfeld (1988). The third condition in
McClennen’s formulation is fairly uncontroversial. However, those defend-
ing alternatives to expected utility theory have called into question both
NEC and SEP. Buchak (2013) discusses both the strategy of abandoning
SEP and that of abandoning NEC, and argues that at least one of them
works.
SEP is characteristic of a choice strategy that was first described by Strotz
(1956), and is now known in the literature as ‘sophisticated choice’.50 So-
49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988).
50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.
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phisticated agents treat continuation trees within dynamic choice problems
as if they were new tress. Moreover, they anticipate, at the beginning of
the dynamic choice problem, that they will do so. Given this prediction
of their own future choice, they choose the action that will lead to their
most preferred prospect. They thus follow a kind of ‘backward induction’
reasoning. Sophisticated agents fail to abide by NEC: they can end up
choosing courses of action that are dispreferred at the beginning of the
choice problem. This can be seen in our example of the dynamic Allais
Paradox. Sophisticated agents behave in the way we assumed above. They
thus suffer the pragmatic disadvantages we described.51
Those who question NEC allow that the dynamic structure of a decision
problem can sometimes make a difference, even if that may have tragic
consequences. But note that one can question NEC as a general principle
and still think that in the particular dynamic choice problems we are
considering, the pragmatic disadvantages count against having preferences
that violate separability.
Because of the difficulties associated with sophistication described above,
many advocates of alternatives to expected utility theory have rejected
SEP instead. For instance, Machina (1989) argues that SEP is close enough
to separability that accepting SEP begs the question against separability.
If SEP is given up, it can make a difference to an agent if she finds
herself in the middle of a dynamic choice problem rather than at the
beginning of a new one. One choice rule that then becomes open to her is
‘resolution’, where the agent simply goes through with a plan she made
at the beginning of a decision problem. Resolute agents obviously abide
by NEC and avoid any pragmatic disadvantages. A restricted version of
this dynamic choice rule is advocated by McClennen (1990).52 Rabinowicz
(1995) argues that sophistication and resolution can be reconciled.
7.2 Time Preferences and Discounting
While dynamic choice theory is concerned with the temporal sequence of
our decisions, there is another branch of decision theory that is concerned
with the timing of the costs and benefits that are caused by our actions.
This literature studies the nature of our time preferences: do we prefer
for an outcome to occur earlier or later? How much would we give up in
order to receive it earlier or later?
51 In fact, Seidenfeld discusses cases where sophisticated agents end up making a sure loss.
52 Note that related notions of resolution are also discussed in the non-formal literature in
order to deal with problems of diachronic choice, such as the Toxin Puzzle, described in
Kavka (1983). See, for instance, Holton (2009) and Bratman (1998), as well as the discussion
on the Self-Torturer Problem in Section 4.3 above.
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Since most agents prefer for good outcomes to occur earlier, and bad
outcomes to occur later, Samuelson (1937) proposed the discounted utility
model. According to this model, agents assign the same utility to an
outcome (in Samuelson’s model these are consumption profiles) no matter
when it occurs, but discount that utility with a fixed exponential discount
rate. They can then calculate how much a future outcome is worth to them
at the time of decision, and maximise their discounted utility. In the case
where decisions are made under certainty, let the outcomes occurring at
different points in time, up until period t, be O1, . . . , Ot. The agent assigns
utility u(O) to each of these outcomes. This is an ‘instantaneous’ utility
function, where the timing of the outcome does not matter for the utility
assignment. Moreover, let d be the discount factor. The agent’s discounted
utility DU(O1, . . . , Ot) is then given by:
DU(O1, . . . , Ot) =
t
∑
i=1
di · u(Oi).
This discounted utility describes the current value of the stream of out-
comes O1, . . . , Ot to the agent. According to the discounted utility model,
agents maximise this discounted utility. When we have 0 < d < 1, the
agent prefers good outcomes to occur sooner rather than later. In that
case, it is also true that the value of an infinite, constant stream of benefits
will be finite. Koopmans (1960) presents a number of axioms on time
preferences, and provides a representation theorem for the discounted
utility model.
One main advantage of being the type of agent who abides by the
discounted utility model is that for such an agent, there will be no pref-
erence reversals as time moves on (this feature is sometimes referred to
as ‘time consistency’). That is, an agent will never suddenly reverse her
preference between two actions as she gets closer in time to a choice.
Yet, such preference reversals are common.53 It has been argued that the
hyperbolic discounting model advocated by Ainslie (1992), which allows
for such reversals, models the ordinary decision-maker better. Whether
the discounted utility model is normatively adequate is controversial, and
depends in part on whether we think that time inconsistency is necessarily
irrational.54 In fact, time inconsistent preferences, just like preferences that
violate expected utility theory, may lead to problematic patterns of choice
in dynamic choice problems, unless the agent adopts the right dynamic
choice rule.
The discounted utility model underlies much public decision-making.
Discount rates are standardly applied in cost-benefit analyses. This has
53 For empirical evidence of this phenomenon, see, for instance, Thaler (1981).
54 Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) provide a helpful overview of this debate,
and the literature on time preferences more generally.
decision theory 99
received special philosophical attention in the case of cost-benefit analyses
of the effects of climate change. Ethicists and economists have debated
whether a strictly positive discount rate is justified when evaluating the
costs of climate change.55 Much recent work on time preference and
discounting has focused on how to discount in the context of uncertainty.
Again, this question is especially important for evaluating the costs of
climate change, since these evaluations are carried out in the context of
great uncertainty. Gollier (2002) provides an expected utility based model
of discounting under uncertainty that much of this literature appeals to.
Weitzman (2009) discusses discounting in a context where our estimates of
future climate have ‘fat tails’, and argues that fat tails make a big difference
to our evaluations of the costs of climate change.
8 concluding remarks
This entry started out by introducing decision theories that can be classified
under the heading of ‘expected utility theory’. Expected utility theory is an
enormously influential theory about how we do and should make choices.
It has been fruitfully applied in many different fields, not least philosophy.
This entry has described expected utility theory, discussed how it can be
applied to the choices real agents face, and introduced debates about its
foundations and interpretation.
Much recent discussion in decision theory concerns the two main types
of challenge to traditional expected utility theory that the latter half of
this entry focused on. The first type of challenge claims that traditional
expected utility theory requires agents to have attitudes that are too
fine-grained and too extensive. According to this challenge, agents have
attitudes, and are rationally permitted to have attitudes that are imprecise,
or vague, or incomplete. The important question arising for expected
utility theory is whether it can incorporate imprecision, vagueness, and
incompleteness, or whether it can instead offer a convincing argument
that these attitudes are indeed irrational.
The second type of challenge questions the assumption of separability
that underlies expected utility theory—that is, the assumption that the
value of an outcome in one state of the world is independent of what
happens in other, incompatible states of the world. According to this chal-
lenge, agents have attitudes to risky prospects that violate this assumption,
and are rationally permitted to do so. This challenge, in particular, has
inspired alternatives to expected utility theory. Alternatives to expected
55 See, in particular, the debate between Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2007). For a philosopher
who holds that there is no justification for time preference in public decision-making, see
Broome (1994).
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utility theory face challenges of their own, however, not least the question
of whether they can make sense of dynamic choice.
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